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Giving the Market a Microphone: Solutions to the 
Ongoing Displacement of U.S. Workers Through 
the H1B Visa Program 
Sam Trimbach* 
Abstract: In recent years, the H1B visa program has been mired in controversy. 
Some have pointed out the way the program is used to aid in outsourcing. Others 
have suggested that employers pay H1B workers less than their U.S. counterparts, 
effectively allowing employers to import cheaper foreign labor. In fact, these can 
go hand-in-hand. The less an employer has to pay an H1B worker, the less ex-
pensive it is to use the program to outsource jobs. In addition to these problems, 
this Note identifies one more: while the current structure of the program helps 
employers bridge a labor gap when there aren’t enough qualified U.S. workers 
in a field, it simultaneously perpetuates that labor gap so that U.S. workers do 
not enter the field and employers must continue hiring through the H1B program.  
This Note argues that labor gaps are perpetuated because the program only re-
quires employers to pay H1B employees what an average U.S. employee in a sim-
ilar position makes. By filling these jobs at the same salary, the labor gap is 
bridged, but there is no increase in salaries. This means that U.S. workers have 
no incentive to move into the field and fill the labor gap. Without new U.S. work-
ers moving into the field, a gap remains, and employers continue to use the H1B 
program. The H1B program has two aims: to allow U.S. employers to bridge a 
labor gap while ensuring that jobs aren’t permanently shifted from U.S. workers 
to foreign workers. By perpetuating the labor gap, the program only satisfies the 
first aim while thwarting the second; jobs are permanently shifted, only the jobs 
are in the geographical United States. 
As such, this Note argues that the H1B program should be revised so that em-
ployers have to pay more for H1B employees than for U.S. employees. The in-
tended effect would be that U.S. workers would see salaries increase in the field 
and more would begin to train to enter the field. This means the labor gap would 
be filled by U.S. workers over time, allowing the program to satisfy both of its 
objectives. Increasing H1B salaries would also make it more expensive to use the 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
In October of 2015, about 250 Disney employees were informed that 
they were being laid off.1 Many of these employees were replaced by non-
resident alien workers entering the United States with H1B visas.2 Some of 
these employees could only receive a severance package if they spent the 
next three months training one of those workers to do their job.3 Earlier that 
year, from March through June of 2015, Toys ‘R’ Us hired eight H1B visa 
workers from Tata Consultancy Services.4 These workers shadowed U.S. 
Toys ‘R’ Us employees and created manuals for sixty-seven of their jobs, 
then returned to India and used those manuals to train workers there.5 The 
 
 1  Julia Preston, Pink Slips at Disney. But First, Training Foreign Replacements, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 
2015, at A1. 
 2  Id. 
 3  Id. 
 4  Julia Preston, Toys ‘R’ Us Brings Temporary Foreign Workers to U.S. to Move Jobs Overseas, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2015, at A1. 
 5  Id. 
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U.S. workers were then laid off.6 These stories are not unique.7 
An H1B visa is a nonimmigrant work visa that allows an alien with spe-
cial skills or knowledge to enter the United States to work in a position that 
requires those skills or that knowledge.8 As such, some claim the program is 
necessary to keep jobs in the United States because it allows U.S. employers 
to fill positions with qualified alien candidates when there are too few quali-
fied U.S. workers.9 With this rationale, many have argued that the program 
works well overall, and only small changes are needed to curb the abuse that 
occurs.10 
This Note will not attempt to discern the truth about the H1B program 
as it is. Instead, it will first argue that the goal of the H1B program is to bridge 
a labor gap in the United States without displacing U.S. workers perma-
nently. It will then argue that the structure of the H1B program keeps it from 
achieving this goal. Finally, it will propose several reforms to the program 
that would help realign the program with its goals. 
Part II of this Note will give an overview of the H1B program and de-
scribe its policy goals. It will begin by reviewing the current structure of the 
H1B program, focusing on the process of obtaining an H1B visa and what 
the visa allows its holder to do. It will then break down the structure into two 
categories of regulations: those that are meant to ensure the alien is qualified, 
and those that are meant to ensure the employer is not displacing U.S. work-
ers. It will argue these categories reflect the competing goals of the H1B pro-
gram: it is meant to help bridge labor gaps in the United States in occupations 
that require special knowledge, but without displacing U.S. workers. Part II 
will conclude with a brief discussion analyzing whether this is a sound policy 
goal. 
Part III will explain why these regulations fail to accomplish the under-
lying policy objectives. It will begin by discussing the effect the structure of 
the H1B program likely has on wages. It will argue that the program allows 
for underpaying H1B workers, and that at its theoretical best, H1B workers 
are paid approximately what a U.S. worker would be paid. This Note argues 
that this is a problem; by paying H1B employees less than or equal to U.S. 
employees, wages in the field will either decrease or stagnate. This provides 
a disincentive to U.S. workers considering entering specialized fields. 
 
 6  Id. 
 7  See id. (several other examples of “outsourcing firms” using H1B visas are described in the article); 
see also Preston, supra note 1 (several other examples of replacing U.S. workers with aliens on H1B visas 
are included). 
 8  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (2012). 
 9  See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Gower, As Dumb As We Wanna Be: U.S. H1-B Visa Policy and the “Brain 
Blocking” of Asian Technology Professionals, 12 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 243 (2011); Suzette B. Mas-
ters & Ted Ruthizer, The H1-B Straitjacket: Why Congress Should Repeal the Cap on Foreign Born 
Highly Skilled Workers, 00-05 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, 1 (2000). 
 10  See, e.g., Todd H. Goodsell, Comment, On The Continued Need for H-1B Reform: A Partial, Stat-
utory Suggestion to Protect Foreign and U.S. Workers, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 153 (2007). 
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The H1B program sets a minimum salary for H1B workers based on the 
position the worker would fill, and this minimum is calculated using an av-
erage of salaries received for similar positions.11 As such, calculating the 
minimum salary does not involve looking at the potential employee’s skills 
or qualifications.12 Because of this, H1B workers who should receive a wage 
premium likely do not. Additionally, because H1B wages are tied to U.S. 
worker wages, the program makes it more difficult for the average wage to 
increase. If wages stagnate, U.S. workers have no incentive to enter the field 
and fill the labor gap. Keeping wages constant (or decreasing them) perpetu-
ates the labor gap, effectively displacing U.S. workers permanently with H1B 
employees. 
Beyond this, allowing U.S. employers to pay less than they should 
makes it easier for employers and outsourcing firms to outsource jobs. If em-
ployers had to pay a premium for H1B workers, this would add greater ex-
pense to the process of outsourcing jobs. For example, if Toys ‘R’ Us had to 
pay Tata Consultancy more for the H1B workers to come and create training 
manuals, it might have decided not to do so. And if Disney had to pay its 
H1B workers more, it may have chosen not to replace so many of its employ-
ees. This suggests that the program not only perpetuates the labor gap in some 
industries, but it also makes it easier for U.S. employers to replace their U.S. 
employees and to outsource their jobs to other countries. 
Part IV will propose solutions to this problem. Fundamentally, each pro-
posal revolves around strengthening market forces within the program. Each 
is meant to help ensure that H1B workers are paid closer to their actual value, 
which would both increase the appeal of these industries for U.S. workers 
and abate abuse of the program for outsourcing. The proposals would also 
take some leverage away from U.S. employers and give it to H1B workers, 
which would curb employment abuses such workers may endure under the 
current regulatory structure. 
One solution would be to change the process of obtaining an H1B visa 
so as to introduce market forces. Here I propose the regulations create a lim-
ited marketplace with employers that have certified positions available and 
alien workers who meet the requirements of an H1B visa. The number of 
each allowed in the market could be set according to regulations, and the 
Department of Labor could change these numbers depending on what effect 
it wanted to have on the market. For example, if the market in an industry 
looked to be oversaturated, it could limit the number of visas for that indus-
try. 
Another solution would be to increase the mobility of H1B employees. 
 
 11  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(i) (2012). This regulation defines the minimum salary that an em-
ployer can offer for a position to an H1B applicant. It defines the salary by the position, not by the appli-
cant.  
 12  Id. 
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The first obstacle to mobility relates to costs; a new employer has to get the 
position certified by the Department of Labor before an H1B employee can 
transfer. This means the employer has to pay fees and incur administrative 
and transaction costs that do not exist for non-H1B employees. My proposal 
here is to create an expedited process with fewer fees when an H1B employee 
wants to change employers. The second obstacle exists for H1B employees 
who are using their H1B employers as sponsors for green cards. If they 
change employers, they are sent back to the end of the line of green card 
applicants. I propose this be changed so the employees can keep their places 
in line, and I argue this will not affect U.S. immigration policy negatively. 
 II. THE H1B VISA PROGRAM AND ITS POLICY GOALS 
Under current United States immigration law, aliens13 are only allowed 
to enter the country — and thus to work there — under certain circumstances. 
Generally, receiving a visa allows an alien to enter the country and stay for a 
certain period of time, and aliens can apply for visas under various pro-
grams.14 A visa is a stamp inside a passport; it is obtained from the U.S. con-
sul in the alien’s home country, and it signals to border officers that the alien 
is entering lawfully.15 There are two major categories of visas: immigrant and 
nonimmigrant.16 Holders of immigrant visas are in the process of immigrat-
ing to the United States and gaining either citizenship or permanent residence 
status.17 Nonimmigrant visas allow aliens to enter the country for specific 
purposes and lengths of time, but they do not help aliens become citizens or 
permanent residents.18 Holders of nonimmigrant visas, however, can try to 
enter an immigrant visa program if they decide they do want to stay in the 
United States permanently.19 
There are numerous classes of nonimmigrant visas, and each class is 
 
 13  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2012) (“The term ‘alien’ means any person not a citizen or national of 
the United States.”). 
 14  See 1 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, & RONALD Y. WADA, 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.03 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2015); but see 8 U.S.C. § 1201(h) 
(2012) (“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to entitle any alien, to whom a visa . . . has been issued, 
to be admitted [to] the United States, if . . . he is found to be inadmissible under this Act.”). 
 15  See id. § 1.02. Note that the border officer will double check to make sure the alien is really allowed 
to enter. 
 16  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2012) (“The term ‘immigrant’ means every alien except an alien who 
is within [a] class[] of nonimmigrant aliens.”); see also, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(26) (2012) (“The term ‘nonim-
migrant visa’ means a visa properly issued to an alien as an eligible nonimmigrant by a competent of-
ficer.”). 
 17  GORDON ET AL., supra note 14, § 1.03. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. (“Nonimmigrants may also be able [to] adjust their status to lawful permanent residence while 
in the United States.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012). 
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defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). Examples of these classes include ambas-
sadors,20 students,21 agricultural laborers,22 and tourists,23 among others. 
Each class of nonimmigrant visa has a defined scope of who can participate 
and how they can participate. The H1B visa is one nonimmigrant visa class. 
 A. The H1B Visa Process 
The H1B program is an employment-based visa; it allows certain aliens 
seeking employment in the United States to enter the country to work.24 A 
participant in the program is “an alien . . . who is coming temporarily to the 
United States to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation . . . who meets 
the requirements for the occupation . . . and with respect to whom the Secre-
tary of Labor determines and certifies . . . that the intending employer has 
filed with the Secretary an application.”25 This definition identifies three re-
quirements to participate in the program: 1) a specialty occupation, 2) a par-
ticipant who has the requisite qualifications, and 3) an employer who files an 
application with the Department of Labor (“DOL”). 
In practice, the employer actually files all of the documentation related 
to the H1B visa. In addition to the application the employer files with the 
DOL, the employer is also responsible for filing the H1B petition with the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).26 This petition 
must include a certified application from the DOL.27 As such, the first step 
in the H1B process is filing a Labor Condition Application (“LCA”) with the 
DOL. If this application is certified, the employer then files a petition with 
UCSIS. Finally, if the petition is approved, the employee applies for a visa 
stamp with the local U.S. consulate.28 
 1. The Labor Condition Application 
The first step in obtaining an H1B visa is filing an LCA with the DOL.29 
An LCA is a description of the position the employer would like to fill with 
 
 20  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A)(i) (2012). 
 21  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i) (2012). 
 22  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2012). 
 23  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (2012). 
 24  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (2012). 
 25  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (2012). 
 26  8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(A) (2012). 
 27  8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(1) (2012). 
 28  STEVEN A. CLARK & VINCENT W. LAU, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.1.2 (Mass. Contin-
uing Legal Educ., Inc., 2012). If the employee is already in the U.S. and maintaining legal status, then the 
employer and employee will have to decide if they want to change the employee’s status to H1B; if so, 
the employer asks UCSIS to change the employee’s status. Id. 
 29  The requirements of the LCA will be discussed in more detail and critiqued in later parts of this 
Note. 
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an H1B worker. Through the LCA, the employer certifies that the position 
satisfies several requirements, each of which is meant to help ensure H1B 
workers do not displace U.S. workers. One requirement is that employers 
must certify that it will pay wages that satisfy a minimum requirement.30 
They must also attest that the working conditions for the H1B employees will 
not adversely affect similarly employed U.S. employees.31 They must also 
attest statements that essentially ensure aliens are not being employed to 
break a strike or other labor dispute.32 Finally, every LCA must specify “the 
number of workers sought, the occupational classification in which the work-
ers will be employed, and wage rate and conditions under which they will be 
employed.”33 Together these are meant to provide assurance that hiring H1B 
employees will not adversely affect the working conditions, wages, or em-
ployment of U.S. employees. 
Some employers have to provide additional statements as part of their 
LCAs. These employers include “H1B-dependent employers” and “willful 
violators.”34 If the employer falls into one of these categories, then it must 
also attest 1) it “has taken good faith steps to recruit . . . United States work-
ers for the job, and has offered the job to any United States worker who ap-
plies and is equally or better qualified,”35 and 2) it “did not displace and will 
not displace a United States worker.”36 This is meant to subject employers to 
additional scrutiny if they are more likely to abuse the program. 
The DOL then reviews the LCA and decides whether or not to certify 
it. Within the DOL, the Employment Training Administration receives and 
certifies LCAs, while the Wage and Hour Division of the Employment Stand-
ards Administration investigates whether an employer has misrepresented 
any facts on or failed to comply with statements in LCAs.37 Enforcement 
actions suggest that the DOL is most concerned with the wages paid to H1B 
workers.38 This means most of the investigation and enforcement occurs after 
the LCA has been certified and the worker has obtained a visa.39 
 2. The H1B Petition and the Visa Stamp 
Once the LCA has been certified, the employer then files a petition with 
USCIS. Part of the petition includes the certified LCA, but new information 
 
 30  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 31  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 32  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(B), (C) (2012). 
 33  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(D) (2012). 
 34  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(E)(ii) (2012). 
 35  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(G)(i) (2012). 
 36  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(E)(i) (2012). 
 37  20 C.F.R. § 655.705(a) (2012). 
 38  STEVEN A. CLARK & VINCENT W. LAU, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.3.3 (Mass. Contin-
uing Legal Educ., Inc., 2012). 
 39  Id. 
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includes the identity of those aliens the employer wants to hire as H1B em-
ployees and their qualifications.40 Here the potential employee is matched up 
to the position described in the LCA, and UCSIS must determine whether the 
statutory guidelines are met. That means it must determine whether the posi-
tion is a “specialty occupation,” and whether the employee has the requisite 
qualifications.41 If the petition is approved, then the H1B applicant can either 
file for change of status (if the applicant is already in the United States) or 
file with the local U.S. consul to get a visa stamp (if the applicant is not in 
the United States yet and needs a stamp to be able to enter the country).42 
 B. The Policy Goals of the H1B Visa Program 
The structure of the H1B visa program reveals the policy goals behind 
the program. The program creates an exception to the general exclusion of 
aliens for those coming here to work in certain jobs: specialty occupations.43 
The statute defines the term specialty occupation as “[A]n occupation that 
requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized 
knowledge, and attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in the specific 
specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the 
United States.”44 The special occupation definition specifies the scope of the 
program, but it also reveals why the visa program was created in the first 
place. It provides a means to expand the applicant pool for employers in 
highly specialized fields where there are a limited number of qualified appli-
cants. 
The other two main provisions limit this. The first requires that the ap-
plicant actually have the requisite qualifications of the occupation. The stat-
ute defines the requirements of a specialty occupation as “[F]ull state licen-
sure . . . if such license is required to practice in the occupation, completion 
of the degree described in paragraph (1)(b) for the occupation, or (i) experi-
ence in the specialty equivalent to the completion of such degree, and (ii) 
recognition of expertise in the specialty.”45 This provision is meant to prevent 
employers from hiring unqualified foreign individuals to fill positions that 
meet the specialty occupation requirements. The second main provision is 
the LCA, discussed above, which can block an H1B visa even if a position is 
in a specialty occupation and the H1B applicant is qualified. This provision 
marks the limit Congress wanted to place on the program: it wanted to keep 
 
 40  See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM I-129: 
PETITION FOR NONIMMIGRANT WORKER (2012), available at http://www.uscis.gove/files/form/i-129.pdf. 
 41  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i) (2012). 
 42  STEVEN A. CLARK & VINCENT W. LAU, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.1.2 (Mass. Contin-
uing Legal Educ., Inc., 2012). 
 43  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) (2012). 
 44  8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) (2012). 
 45  8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(2) (2012). 
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employers from displacing or harming U.S. employees by hiring H1B em-
ployees. 
 III. DOES THE PROGRAM WORK? 
 A. Theoretical Problems 
Several potential issues with the structure of the H1B visa program have 
been identified previously in the literature. First, the statute sets a minimum 
wage requirement using the actual wage and the prevailing wage,46 which 
some commenters have argued can both be below the market wage an em-
ployee would ordinarily command. Second, the statute requires that H1B-
dependent employers and willful violators of the H1B program try to find an 
equally-qualified American employee before resorting to the H1B program,47 
which, as some commenters have argued, has no viable enforcement mecha-
nism. 
 1. The Wage Issue 
As referenced previously, as part of the LCA the employer files with the 
DOL, the employer must attest that it is offering a wage that meets a mini-
mum requirement. The minimum wage must be the greater of “(I) the actual 
wage level paid by the employer to all other individuals with similar experi-
ence and qualifications for the specific employment in question, or (II) the 
prevailing wage level for the occupational classification in the area of em-
ployment.”48 These will be referenced as “actual wage” and “prevailing 
wage.” Actual wage depends on what other employees in similar positions 
are earning at that place of employment, while prevailing wage depends on 
industry wage data for similar positions. Neither is a perfect substitute for 
market conditions and productivity that would ordinarily determine an em-
ployee’s wage. 
An actual wage calculation requires a comparison to an employer’s 
other employees. To determine which employees should be used in the actual 
wage calculation, employers need to consider several factors: “experience, 
qualifications, education, job responsibility and function, specialized 
knowledge, and other legitimate business factors.”49 When an existing em-
ployee is similar to a future employee along these factors, that employee is 
counted. So if “there are other employees with substantially similar experi-
 
 46  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 47  8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(n)(1)(E), (G) (2012). 
 48  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 49  20 C.F.R. § 655.731(a)(1) (2014). 
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ence and qualifications . . . [who] have substantially the same duties and re-
sponsibilities . . . the actual wage shall be the amount paid to these other em-
ployees.”50 By substituting the amount paid to similar employees, the actual 
wage approximates the salary the H1B applicant would command on the 
open market. 
There are two issues with this. First, it assumes that the other employees 
were hired in an open market and in the same market conditions. If the similar 
employees are H1B employees, thus not hired on an open market, then tying 
the new employees wage to the existing H1B’s wage does not ensure a mar-
ket price. Meanwhile, if market conditions have changed since the existing 
employees were hired, the salary paid when hired is not a good proxy for the 
current market price. The second issue is that the “substantially similar” lan-
guage allows for a large amount of discretion on the employer’s part; an em-
ployer can attest that it meets the actual wage requirement by saying none of 
its employees is similar (although this can look suspicious to the Department 
of Labor). Additionally, an employer can frame a job posting in a way that it 
would only include lower-paid employees as substantially similar. The em-
ployer frames the actual wage discussion, and the Department of Labor can 
choose to investigate but does not do so in every case. 
The employer also researches and submits the prevailing wage as part 
of the LCA, but the prevailing wage is determined by the wage that similar 
employees earn in the same region for doing the same job. Once again, it 
creates a proxy for a market price, but this time by considering what people 
at other employers earn for doing a similar job. Generally, the prevailing 
wage is “the arithmetic mean of the wages of workers similarly employed,”51 
and “the employer is not required to use any specific methodology to deter-
mine the prevailing wage,”52 although there are small exceptions to both.53 
Employers usually have three options when they are calculating the prevail-
ing wage; they can ask the DOL to make a determination (through its Na-
tional Prevailing Wage Center), they can use an “independent authoritative 
source,” or they can use “another legitimate source of wage information.”54 
The DOL determination relies on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s Oc-
cupational Employment Statistics (“OES”) data.55 The OES data allows an 
employer to find wage data based on date, location, and occupational code, 
and it gives the employer four wage levels that correspond to the applicant’s 
experience and education and the position’s supervision responsibility.56 But 
 
 50  Id. 
 51  20 C.F.R. § 655.731(a)(2)(ii) (2014). 
 52  20 C.F.R. § 655.731(a)(2) (2014). 
 53  In exceptional cases, the median is used, or the employer must use a specific methodology. 
 54  20 C.F.R. § 655.731(a)(2) (2014); AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., H1B HANDBOOK § 2:28 
(2015). 
 55  FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 54, § 2:30. 
 56  Id. § 2:31. 
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an employer can use this data to figure out what the DOL would likely deter-
mine the prevailing wage to be and compare that to other surveys to find the 
one that yields the lowest prevailing wage.57 Meanwhile, the OES data has 
been criticized for a number of reasons, one being that there is significant 
fluctuation from year to year due to the way the data is collected and orga-
nized.58 The definition of geographic regions can be changed, and which em-
ployers are included in the data can be changed (whether because of who was 
sampled or who chose to respond).59 Additionally, because of the way occu-
pations are categorized, the wage determination under the OES data is often 
higher than using other surveys.60 As such, employers often choose to use 
other wage data. 
One issue here is the same as with the actual wage determination; the 
prevailing wage is an administrative approximation that gives employers and 
the Department of Labor a salary number without any regard for market con-
ditions. As such, the same criticisms apply here; it assumes that those with 
similar positions received their salaries on an open market, and it assumes 
the market has not changed since those determinations were made. Addition-
ally, the prevailing wage determination assigns a salary to the position the 
employer wants to fill. If the employer uses the OES data, then it must take 
the employee’s experience and qualifications into account when deciding be-
tween the four wage levels.61 But this is subject to interpretation, and the 
DoL’s guidance documents have pushed many employers to use other sur-
veys instead.62 
The wage requirements are meant to ensure H1B workers are not paid 
less than their American counterparts (as this would incentivize hiring H1B 
workers over Americans). The issues above already suggest that employers 
may be able to frame their positions in ways that actually allow them to do 
that. One example of this would be by hiring younger employees with little 
experience.63 But even if we could ensure that the actual and prevailing wage 
levels were accurate (the employers did not game the system to get the lowest 
numbers possible), there is another issue with these wage restrictions. They 
set the lower limit for hiring an H1B worker at the average of existing em-
 
 57  Id. § 2:29. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. § 2:31. 
 62  Id. § 2:32 (“[T]he [current] prevailing wage worksheets has resulted in most labor certifications . . . 
being classified under the highest wage listed in the OES System. For this reason, the use of alternate 
surveys should continue to be an important strategic option for LCA practice.”). The Department of La-
bor’s guidance documents suggest that employers were using lower wage levels than they should have, 
but forcing them to choose higher wage levels likely just pushes them to use other survey data instead. 
 63  Norman Matloff, Immigration and the Tech Industry: As a Labour Shortage Remedy, For Innova-
tion, or For Cost Savings?, 10 MIGRATION LETTERS 210, 222 (2013). 
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ployees, but H1B candidates may be above average applicants. If an em-
ployer can hire an above average candidate, one that it expects to have above 
average productivity, for the price of an average candidate, it will likely 
choose that above-average candidate. This gives U.S. employers incentive to 
hire H1B employees over U.S. employees even if their wages are equal. 
On top of this, employers may prefer H1B employees because they are 
less mobile than U.S. employees. First, while the statute does allow workers 
to change employers, this is difficult to accomplish.64 Second, an H1B em-
ployee can only work for an employer with a position for which there is a 
certified LCA, and UCSIS still needs to determine whether the position qual-
ifies as an H1B position and that the employee is qualified for that position.65 
If the other employer did not have a certified LCA already, it would have to 
essentially start the visa process over, except that the cap would not apply. 
The first issue here is a timing one; if the original employer fired the H1B 
worker before the new employer finished this process, the worker would have 
to leave the country and try to get a new H1B visa in the next year.66 On top 
of this, the new employer would have to pay all of the administrative costs 
associated with the H1B process, which might lower the salary it would offer 
or change its decision to offer employment in the first place. 
Additionally, if the employee is working towards a green card, the em-
ployee would essentially have to start the entire process over with the new 
employer.67 This is because the employment-based legal residence system 
requires employers to file a Labor Certification Application, not to be con-
fused with the LCA for H1B employees.68 As such, unless the new employer 
already has a DOL-certified position, it will have to file a new application.69 
In very limited circumstances, the immigrant will be able to maintain the 
priority date of the original petition.70 Otherwise, their priority will essen-
tially be reset, and they’ll be placed at the end of the line. Employees working 
toward green cards might not want to risk trying to start the process over, 
meaning they might stick with their employer even if they are getting paid 
too little. 
This general lack of mobility means employers don’t have to worry very 
much about H1B employees leaving at inopportune times. This is another 
reason employers may prefer to hire an H1B worker instead of an American 
worker (who has more freedom to leave for another employer).71 This all 
 
 64  Id. at 210–11. 
 65  Id. 
 66  FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 54, § 4:29. 
 67  Matloff, supra note 63, at 210–11. 
 68  See 4 GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, & RONALD Y. WADA, IMMIGRATION 
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 44.02 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2015). 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Matloff, supra note 63, at 221. 
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suggests that 1) the wage provisions allow employers to offer a lower salary 
than they otherwise would, and 2) employees have less freedom to try to cor-
rect this by approaching other employers. 
 2. Recruitment and Non-Displacement of U.S. Workers 
Certain employers are required to attest to two more provisions in their 
LCAs. These include “H1B-dependent employers” and “willful violators.”72 
If the employer falls into one of these categories, then it must also attest that 
1) it “has taken good faith steps to recruit . . . United States workers for the 
job, and has offered the job to any United States worker who applies and is 
equally or better qualified,”73 and 2) it “did not displace and will not displace 
a United States worker.”74 This subsection will first consider the two types 
of employers that have to attest to these two provisions, and then it will con-
sider the provisions themselves. 
The two additional requirements are applied to employers that are par-
ticularly likely to abuse the H1B program. The first is H1B-dependent em-
ployers, defined as employers with a proportion of H1B employees above a 
threshold amount.75 However, it is relatively easy to get around this require-
ment because employers can 1) “count all of its employees (e.g., janitors, 
secretaries, etc.) when calculating the ratio,” and 2) H1B applicants are ex-
empt from this scrutiny if they “have a master’s degree or an annual income 
of at least sixty thousand dollars.”76 The second is willful violators, who have 
committed violations in the preceding five years that the agency determines 
were “a willful failure or a misrepresentation of a material fact.”77 These two 
groups of employers are subject to additional scrutiny for good reason; hav-
ing a high proportion of H1B workers suggests you may be purposely recruit-
ing H1B workers instead of American workers, while willfully violating the 
statute in the past suggests intent to use the program in a way it shouldn’t be 
used. However, the specific scrutiny involved may not be effective. 
The first piece of extra scrutiny is the recruitment requirement, by which 
the employer is required “to take good faith steps to recruit U.S. workers . . . 
us[ing] procedures that meet industry-wide standards and offer compensation 
 
 72  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(E)(ii) (2012). 
 73  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(G)(i) (2012). Note that this is one of the additional requirements in the Labor 
Certification Application that employers must file when sponsoring an immigrant through an employ-
ment-based program.  
 74  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(E)(i) (2012). 
 75  20 C.F.R. § 655.736(a)(1) (2014). The exact number of H1Bs needed to trigger this requirement 
depends on the overall number of employees the employer employs. 
 76  Christopher Fulmer, Comment, A Critical Look at the H1B Visa Program and Its Effects on U.S. 
and Foreign Workers—A Controversial Program Unhinged from Its Original Intent, 13 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 823, 827 (2009). 
 77  20 C.F.R. § 655.736(f)(1) (2014). 
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at least as great as the required wage [for H1B employees].”78 This means 
there is a requirement to advertise the position in a certain way and to involve 
U.S. workers in the application process, for example by interviewing them.79 
Employers also have to use “legitimate selection criteria,” and they have to 
offer employment to a U.S. worker who is equally qualified before extending 
an offer to an H1B candidate.80 
One issue here is the amount of discretion employers have when deter-
mining their selection criteria and deciding whether a U.S. worker is equally 
qualified.81 This makes it very difficult to prove bad faith. A U.S. candidate 
could have similar education and experience, but the employer could claim 
the candidate did not interview well. Additionally, having similar qualifica-
tions is not the same as being equally qualified, suggesting an employer could 
decide to hire the H1B candidate because of a distinction that should not 
make a difference. On top of this, the employer is only required to offer a 
U.S. candidate the same minimum salary used in the ordinary H1B LCA, 
which was noted above as potentially being below-market. As such, the re-
quirement that the employer make an offer to equally qualified U.S. workers 
could simply require a bad offer that the worker would never take. 
The second piece of extra scrutiny is that the employer must attest that 
hiring an H1B worker will not displace a U.S. worker. This requires the em-
ployer to attest it will not 1) lay off a U.S. worker in a job that is 2) “essen-
tially equivalent to the job for which an H1B nonimmigrant is sought.”82 
While this means an employer subject to this requirement will not be allowed 
to replace a U.S. worker with an H1B worker, if the employer is creating a 
new position without removing an old one, this does not impose any addi-
tional requirement. The employer still must follow the first requirement for 
good faith effort to recruit a U.S. worker, though. To determine whether a 
job is “essentially equivalent,” the employer must consider the job responsi-
bilities, “qualifications and experience of the workers,” and the area of em-
ployment.83 If one of these is different, two positions are not “essentially 
equivalent,” making it potentially very easy for an employer to get around 
this requirement. For example, an employer might be allowed to lay off a 
U.S. worker who has worked there for three years and hire an H1B worker 
with no experience (as this difference in experience would make the two po-
sitions different). 
 
 78  20 C.F.R. § 655.739 (2014). 
 79  FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 54, §§ 2:75–77 (2015). 
 80  8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(G)(i) (2012). 
 81  Alaina M. Beach, Note, H-1B Visa Legislation: Legal Deficiencies and the Need for Reform, 6 
S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 273, 287 (2010). 
 82  20 C.F.R. § 655.738(b) (2014). 
 83  20 C.F.R. § 655.738(b)(2) (2014). 
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 3. Outsourcing 
The stories from the introduction to this Note are examples where these 
requirements did not work, because the employer was not required to make 
these additional statements or because they lied or because they used a loop-
hole. In 2014, Tata Consultancy Services, the outsourcing firm that had its 
H1B employees create manuals for jobs at Toys ‘R’ Us, received the most 
H1B visas out of every employer in the United States.84 While more than 
10,000 employers filed at least one H1B petition, the 20 companies that filed 
the most petitions received close to 40% of the visas allowed under the cap.85 
Of those 20 companies, 13 were global outsourcing firms (and one was Tata 
Consultancy Services). 
When outsourcing firms hire in the United States, they generally fall 
within the H1B-dependent category of employers. This is because typically, 
a large proportion of those they hire are H1B employees.86 Ordinarily, this 
means they would be required to make the additional attestations referenced 
above. However, the program makes an exception if the H1B applicant will 
be paid “an annual income of at least sixty thousand dollars.”87 In fact, ac-
cording to Professor Ronil Hira of Howard University, many of the tempo-
rary workers at outsourcing firms are paid $60,000, or just above it.88 
The current cap on H1B workers is 85,000, although 20,000 of those are 
set apart for student visa-holders who will graduate from U.S. universities.89 
In 2014, UCSIS received 233,000 applications within the first week.90 Five 
outsourcing firms submitted almost a quarter of those, submitting 55,000 ap-
plications.91 Tata submitted upwards of 14,000, and ultimately received 
5,650 visas.92 
This runs directly counter to the policy behind the H1B program. For 
outsourcing firms, the goal is the opposite of the H1B policy; they are trying 
to move jobs out of the United States. The H1B program is meant to be used 
to hire qualified aliens in specialty occupations in the United States when 
there are not enough qualified U.S. workers. This clearly subverts that pur-
pose by replacing qualified U.S. workers temporarily in the U.S. with H1B 
 
 84  Julia Preston, Large Companies Game H-1B Visa Program, Costing the U.S. Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 10, 2015, at A1. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.736(a)(1) (2014) (describing the proportion of H1B employees that 
triggers status as an H1B-dependent employer). 
 87  Christopher Fulmer, Comment, A Critical Look at the H1B Visa Program and Its Effects on U.S. 
and Foreign Workers—A Controversial Program Unhinged from Its Original Intent, 13 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 823, 827 (2009). 
 88  Preston, supra note 84, at A18. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. 
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workers and then permanently abroad. The only apparent reason outsourcing 
firms are able to do what they have been while complying with the law is the 
exception to the additional attestations when employees are paid $60,000.93 
Nothing about this exception suggests that Congress would have wanted em-
ployers to use it to outsource jobs. 
While displacing U.S. workers is the immediate goal and effect of out-
sourcing, these firms have argued that they help keep jobs in the United 
States in the long run. They argue that outsourcing some positions allows 
U.S. companies to keep other positions in the United States and remain com-
petitive in the international market.94 To use the Toys ‘R’ Us example, Tata 
would argue that if Toys ‘R’ Us did not outsource some of its jobs to India, 
it would ultimately have to move all of its jobs there. 
This type of reasoning should not be compelling under H1B policy. 
Nothing in the text of the program or its structure suggests an exception when 
an employer may have to leave the United States to remain competitive. Fur-
ther, Congress would essentially be condoning abuse of the program if it gave 
discretion to employers to determine when they needed to outsource some 
positions and to keep other ones in the United States. With no evidence that 
Congress intended employers to be allowed to use the H1B program to out-
source jobs, and no reason to believe this is in line with the policy goals of 
the H1B program, the $60,000 annual salary exception for H1B-dependent 
employers should be changed. 
 B. The Economic Data 
Three major issues with the H1B program were identified in Part III.A: 
the LCA wage requirement allows employers to underpay H1B workers, the 
LCA requirements for H1B-dependent employers and willful violators give 
employers too much discretion, and the $60,000 exception allows H1B-de-
pendent employers and willful violators to avoid those additional require-
ments anyway. The real-world data related to each of these will be reviewed 
in this Section. 
 1. H1B Employee Wages 
Under the wage requirements of the LCA, employers must attest they 
will pay H1B workers at least the actual or prevailing wage. Most research 
on wage data focuses on technology industries because these make up a ma-
jority of H1B petitions.95 Some researchers have found that H1B workers are 
 
 93  See Fulmer, supra note 87, at 827. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Sunil Mithas & Henry C. Lucas, Jr., Are Foreign IT Workers Cheaper? U.S. Visa Policies and 
Compensation of Information Technology Professionals, 56 MGMT. SCI. 745, 747 (2010) (citing E.J. Park, 
Unworthy of a Nation Built by Immigrants: The Political Mobilization of H1B Workers, in MOVEMENT 
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paid less than American workers, and that companies prefer to hire them be-
cause of this.96 Others have found that H1B workers are paid the same or 
more.97 
One major issue here is theoretical. The question this Note poses is 
whether H1B employees paid the prevailing or actual wage could be paid less 
than their market values. But there is no market available to determine their 
market values. The regulations essentially use the average of a defined set of 
salaries, and each may or may not have been the result of market forces. Re-
gardless, they are not the exact market forces that would determine an indi-
vidual employee’s salary. This is essentially what researchers are doing here 
when they compare H1B salaries to U.S. worker salaries. 
The underlying question is essentially impossible to answer because a 
number of factors affect a typical market wage, including the applicant’s pro-
jected productivity, the supply of similarly qualified workers, and the de-
mand for employees with those qualifications. These factors will be different 
for the H1B applicant as compared to the U.S. workers included in the aver-
ages. For example, if a prospective employee has skills or knowledge above 
those required for the job,98 studies suggest that this type of additional 
knowledge ordinarily commands a premium.99 But this additional knowledge 
likely will not be factored into either the actual wage or prevailing wage cal-
culation for an H1B candidate. This allows an employer to get a bargain on 
an over-qualified H1B candidate. 
Some have compared the prevailing wage to an estimated market wage 
and concluded that employers do pay H1B workers below market wages.100 
But this likely relies on too many assumptions and estimates to be reliable. 
Markets are the only efficient way to determine market price, and here, we 
have no market. Each H1B employee is hired in the context of the H1B pro-
gram, in which the wage is set using an average of other wages rather than 
through an ordinary market process. While we can compare the H1B wages 
 
OF GLOBAL TALENT: THE IMPACT OF HIGH SKILL LABOR FLOWS FROM INDIA AND CHINA 75, 75 (Prince-
ton University ed. 2007)). 
 96  Norman Matloff, Immigration and the Tech Industry: As a Labour Shortage Remedy, For Innova-
tion, or For Cost Savings?, 10 MIGRATION LETTERS 210 (2013). 
 97  Mithas & Lucas, supra note 95. 
 98  For example, a programmer might know additional programming languages beyond those required 
for the job that could still be useful for job performance. 
 99  Norman Matloff, Immigration and the Tech Industry: As a Labour Shortage Remedy, For Innova-
tion, or For Cost Savings?, 10 MIGRATION LETTERS 210, 219 (2013). For example, in the computer in-
dustry, a 2011 study suggested knowledge of RUBY commanded a salary premium up to 70%, while 
knowledge of iPhone/Android programming commanded a premium of around 20%. 
 100 For example, id., at 220–21 (suggesting that H1B wages are clustered at the prevailing wage, with 
the majority of H1B employees receiving less than 1.2 times the prevailing wage (at many firms included 
in the study, a majority of H1B employees earned 1.05 or less times the prevailing wage). Meanwhile, the 
study suggests 20% is “a conservative value for the wage premium for special skills” that prevailing wage 
may not take into account). 
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to U.S. wages—which are set on a market—we cannot know what H1B 
wages would be on the market. 
As such, for the purposes of this Note, wage data regarding H1B work-
ers is not useful. Instead, the proposed changes should be made because they 
will help increase wages, which should be the goal even if we cannot know 
what the market price is. 
 2. Non-Displacement and Recruitment of U.S. Workers 
As discussed above, certain employers must try to hire a qualified U.S. 
worker before resorting to the H1B program and must not displace a U.S. 
worker through the program. There is very little quantitative data related to 
these two requirements, but some anecdotal evidence suggests that employ-
ers try to get around them. For example, one member of a human resources 
team posted an anonymous comment that: 
[E]mployers routinely get around that requirement by running fraud-
ulent job ads and conducting bad faith interviews of qualified Ameri-
can workers and then simply rejecting all American applicants . . . I 
have over ten years experience in corporate Human Resources depart-
ments and technical recruiting operation, and I have actually seen 
these tactics used. Many HR reps are aware of these tactics but do not 
speak out in public for fear of losing their careers.101 
This is an anonymous comment on a blog, so it is not a verifiable story, 
but it is reasonable that most HR representatives would only speak on this 
topic anonymously. 
Additionally, as mentioned above, an employer can get around these 
requirements so long as an H1B hire is exempt, meaning they either receive 
at least $60,000 or have a master’s degree.102 The employer still must meet 
the wage requirement, but this means any position with an LCA wage re-
quirement of $60,000 or above will be exempt from this scrutiny. This Note 
has already reviewed the issue with outsourcing firms the $60,000 exemption 
has caused. Not only do these firms use the program to send jobs out of the 
United States, but they also take up some of the limited number of visas, 
removing potential visas for employers acting within the purpose of the law 
(and potentially forcing them to hire abroad).103 
 
 101 Beach, supra note 81, at 288 (quoting Posting of HR Representative to IT Business Edge, H1B 
Visa Proposal: ‘Unintended Consequences’ All Around, http:// www.itbusinessedge.com/cm/blogs/ 
all/H1B-visa-proposal-unintended-consequences-all-around/?cs=10104 (Apr. 9, 2007, 06:54)). 
 102 20 C.F.R. § 655.737(b) (2014).  
 103 See Julia Preston, Large Companies Game H-1B Visa Program, Costing the U.S. Jobs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2015, at A18 (telling two stories of employers having to hire abroad after losing out in 
the H1B lottery). 
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 3. The Issue of Fraud 
The final issue is fraud. Employers fulfill each of the requirements of 
the H1B program based on their uncorroborated attestations as part of the 
petition process. It is possible that employers lie on these applications. In 
response to concerns about immigration fraud, the United States Citizenship 
and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) created the Office of Fraud Detection 
and National Security (“FDNS”) in May of 2004.104 FDNS then set up the 
Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessment (“BFCA”) in early 2005 to “eval-
uate the integrity of various nonimmigrant and immigrant benefit pro-
grams.”105 The results of this assessment were summarized in a 2008 report, 
which stated that 51 out of 246 reviewed H1B cases were confirmed as hav-
ing violated the statute or regulations.106 This is a violation rate of just over 
20%. 
USCIS responded by issuing internal guidance in October 2008 that 
used data from the BFCA to try to determine indicators that increased the 
likelihood of violation.107 This guidance was shared within USCIS, with in-
structions to send applications with these indicators to FDNS for additional 
scrutiny.108 Additionally, USCIS started an Administrative Site Visit and 
Verification Program in 2009 (“ASVVP”), through which FDNS “conducts 
unannounced post-adjudication site visits to verify information contained in 
randomly-selected H1B visa petitions.”109 In 2010, 14% of the 14,433 
ASVVP inspections found a violation.110 
As such, not only are there issues with the LCA requirements when they 
are followed, employers often do not follow those requirements in practice. 
 IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The overall policy goal of the H1B program is to bridge labor gaps in 
 
 104 H1B Visas: Designing a Program to Meet the Needs of the U.S. Economy and U.S. Workers: Hear-
ing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, 112th 
Cong. 4 (2011) (written testimony of Donald Neufeld, Assoc. Dir., Serv. Ctr. Operations Directorate, U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigration Servs.). 
 105 Id. Originally, the program was titled the Benefit Fraud Assessment Program, or BFA, but USCIS 
renamed it. 
 106 U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., H1B BENEFIT FRAUD & COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT 
7 (Sept. 2008). 
 107 H1B Visas: Designing a Program to Meet the Needs of the U.S. Economy and U.S. Workers: Hear-
ing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, 112th 
Cong. 5 (2011) (written testimony of Donald Neufeld, Assoc. Dir., Serv. Ctr. Operations Directorate, U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigration Servs.).  
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 6. 
 110 Id. 
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the United States in occupations that require special knowledge without dis-
placing U.S. workers. The structure of the program fails to accomplish this 
goal for three reasons: 1) it allows U.S. employers to pay H1B employees 
less than they would command “on the market,” causing employers to prefer 
hiring H1B employees; 2) it limits the mobility of H1B employees, especially 
those trying to obtain lawful residence status, further causing employers to 
prefer H1B employees; and 3) it gives outsourcing firms a cheap means to 
move U.S. jobs to other countries. The first two cause the internal displace-
ment of U.S. workers with aliens, and they potentially cause a permanent 
internal displacement by perpetuating a labor gap. The third causes the ex-
ternal displacement of U.S. workers. Both of these are counter to the pro-
gram’s policy objectives. 
This Note proposes two changes to the structure of the H1B program 
that may reintroduce market forces such that H1B wages would correspond 
to market value. These would also allow for an ordinary, corrective market 
force to close the labor gap by increasing wages, signaling to U.S. workers 
that they should enter these fields. This Note also proposes a change to em-
ployment-based legal residency that would allow applicants to maintain their 
original priority date after changing employers. Finally, it offers a simple so-
lution to the issue of outsourcing and then discusses whether this would fit 
with the other proposals. 
 A. Changing the H1B Visa Process 
The H1B visa process should be changed to introduce market forces at 
the initial hiring stage. Of course, we don’t want direct competition between 
H1B applicants and U.S. workers without some limitations because many 
H1B applicants would work for lower wages than U.S. workers. One way to 
create a market within the hiring program would be to set up a market that 
brought together employers with certified LCAs and applicants who meet the 
qualifications. The number of each allowed in the market could be set ac-
cording to regulations, similar to the current cap, potentially using a lottery 
when necessary. 
For example, if UCSIS received 250,000 applications for a year and 
DOL determined that there should be 100,000 visas given, the lottery system 
would determine which applicants received the visas, but then the employers 
would have to bid over those applicants. This type of market would allow a 
good amount of control on the part of UCSIS and DOL. If they wanted em-
ployers to pay a higher premium for H1B workers (pushing employers to hire 
from the U.S. pool and signaling to U.S. workers that they may want to enter 
these fields), they could limit the number of H1B applicants but not the num-
ber of employers. Not only would this increase wages for H1B workers, it 
would increase job security (and potentially wages) for U.S. workers in fields 
with large numbers of H1B employees. This would create an incentive for 
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more U.S. workers to try to enter these fields, thus eliminating the problem 
of eternal internal displacement. 
One potential argument against this DOL-created-market approach has 
two parts. First, one could argue that hiring foreign workers does not replace 
American workers, either because the two are not substitutive but rather com-
plementary, or because the foreign workers add enough value that their use 
ends up creating new jobs to be filled by U.S. workers. Second, one could 
argue that increasing the labor costs for U.S. employers, especially in the tech 
industry, will lead to 1) outsourcing, 2) a decrease in those employers’ com-
petitive edge in the global market, or 3) both. 
The first part of this argument is largely a data-driven question, one that 
we likely cannot answer with current studies. The idea that foreign workers 
are complementary rather than substitutive is one that is not contemplated in 
the statute, as evidenced by the recruitment and non-displacement require-
ments for H1B-dependent and willful violator employers. But it is possible 
that at least some employers do treat them this way. The proposition that 
foreign workers add enough value to create new jobs is a bit trickier. For 
example, there is a question of which jobs are created, and whether they are 
equivalent to the jobs that the H1B employees are filling. Additionally, what 
would be the ratio of H1B employees to new jobs created? We would have a 
very different picture if every five H1B employees created one new job for a 
U.S. worker than if it were one-to-one. 
Each of these issues could be taken into account in determining how to 
set up the market, as they would affect what kind of premium we want em-
ployers to have to pay for H1B employees. Additionally, these arguments 
would suggest there should be no limit to H1B visas, including no lower 
wage limits. As it is, the law simply does not ascribe to these ideas. Instead, 
it suggests that Congress believed H1B and U.S. workers were substitutive, 
and H1B workers did not create new U.S. jobs at a one-to-one ratio. Other-
wise U.S. workers would have no need for the protections the law puts in 
place (and in fact, the protections would have the opposite effect). While 
Congress may have been incorrect about whether these protections were 
needed, new economic data is necessary to determine to what extent it was. 
Another argument against this approach would be that this is not really 
moving wages to market value but rather inflating them to an above-market 
rate. But this misses the point of my proposal, which is not to find a way to 
create a market that will yield a true market value. A market that allowed free 
competition between U.S. and alien workers would be disastrous, as the mar-
ket would be flooded with inexpensive labor. My proposal instead focuses 
on creating a market signal where one has been silenced. When there are not 
enough qualified U.S. employees in a field, I suggest wages in that field 
should increase, even when some positions are filled by foreign workers. 
This is because the main purpose of the limiting portions of the H1B 
program is to avoid the permanent displacement of U.S. workers. If there is 
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no increase in wages to incentivize U.S. workers to enter the field, there will 
never be enough U.S. workers to fill the positions, and they will always be 
filled using H1B workers. This causes perpetual displacement of U.S. work-
ers, even if they are displaced within the geographical United States by H1B 
visa holders. My proposal is meant to allow the Department of Labor to cre-
ate an inflated rate when there is a wide labor gap. This should cause some 
U.S. workers to enter the field, reducing the need for H1B workers in the 
future. This ultimately should reduce the number of U.S. jobs that are per-
manently filled by H1B workers. 
A final argument against this market approach would be that increasing 
the cost of wages in these industries would push more of these jobs to other 
countries. This is an important consideration, and it is something the Depart-
ment of Labor should take into account when determining the composition 
of the H1B market each year. But the H1B program cannot solve the out-
sourcing issue. Additionally, by increasing the price of H1B workers, the 
outsourcing method described used by Tata and Toys ‘R’ Us would be more 
expensive, potentially offsetting the push toward outsourcing. 
 B. Increasing H1B Employee Mobility 
There are two main obstacles to H1B employee mobility. The first is 
that the H1B visa is essentially awarded to a position at an employer, even 
though it is literally given to the employee. If an H1B employee wants to 
change employers, the new employer has to have a certified LCA with room 
for another H1B employee, or else it has to start the application process from 
the beginning. The second main obstacle has to do with H1B employees 
working towards obtaining green cards. Many H1B workers are eligible for 
an employment-based permanent residency status, but it can take years to 
actually receive it. Switching an employer will cause the employee to start 
the process over again. 
The first issue relates to switching employers while maintaining an H1B 
visa. The employee can only switch employers easily if the employer has a 
certified LCA that includes an unused position that matches the employee’s 
qualifications/position. If any of these requirements is not met, the employer 
will have to file a new H1B petition, going through the ordinary process. 
Getting an LCA approved by the DOL can take weeks, and if the employee 
loses the position at the previous H1B employer before the process is com-
plete (for example if they find out the employee is leaving and retaliate), the 
employee will lose its existing H1B status and have to leave the country.111 
This means the potential new employer would have to go through the ordi-
nary H1B process and hope the employee gets a new visa through the lottery 
(assuming the cap is reached, which is essentially a given at this point). 
 
 111 FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 54, § 4:29. 
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One potential change here would be that there could be an expedited 
LCA process for non-H1B dependent and non-willful violator employers. 
This is because an employee is unlikely to want to change employers to get 
a wage decrease, meaning the DOL likely does not need to scrutinize the 
offered wage as closely. Another option would be to allow these employers 
to file their H1B petitions before receiving the LCA certification, requiring 
them to submit it within 30 days.112 For H1B-dependent and willful violator 
employers, the LCA has additional requirements for non-displacement and 
recruitment of U.S. workers. These would still be necessary for such employ-
ers when they hire away from another H1B employer. Each of these pro-
posals would reduce the chance of H1B employees losing their jobs with their 
first employers before getting paperwork straightened out with their second 
employers. This means these proposals would reduce the chance that H1B 
employees would need to start the visa process over again when switching 
employers. 
Another issue that reduces H1B employee mobility relates to the trans-
action and administrative costs associated with filing the necessary paper-
work. The ordinary fees apply, and there are legal expenses related to all of 
the paperwork and documentation to be kept. While these would exist 
whether the employer was hiring an H1B employee for the first time or hiring 
the employee away from another employer, it does change the calculus of 
when an employer would try to hire someone away. For example, the new 
employer may consider the employee to be worth $10,000 more than the in-
itial employer. The employer may have to pay up to $4,325 just in fees asso-
ciated with the H1B application, meaning it would only offer a $5,675 raise 
to the employee (ignoring potential legal fees). Meanwhile, the costs of relo-
cation may make a change in employer only worth it to the employee if the 
raise is at least $7,000. 
One change would be to lower the fees for hiring an H1B away from 
another employer. Most employers have to pay up to $1,500 for an education 
and training fee,113 all have to pay a $500 anti-fraud fee and a $325 filing fee, 
and currently, some employers have to pay an additional $2,000 fee.114 Some 
of these fees could be avoided using the same method as above: by allowing 
them to avoid filing a new visa application. This would mean they would 
only have to pay the fee and administrative costs associated with the LCA, 
which would be a significant cost savings. 
 
 112 This was actually done for a period of time in 2009 for all of these applications due to complaints 
related to the amount of time it took to receive LCA certification. Id., § 4:29. 
 113 FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 54, § 4:28 (2015) (“Some employers are exempt from the edu-
cation and training fee . . . (e.g., institutions of higher education and their affiliated nonprofit entities, 
nonprofit research organizations, and governmental research organizations).” Employers with 25 or fewer 
full-time employees only have to pay $750 instead of the ordinary $1,500. 
 114 Id. (The additional fee is for employers “with more than 50% of their employees in the United 
States in H-1B or L-1A or L-1B nonimmigrant status.”). This provision is scheduled to expire. 
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The final issue of H1B employee mobility relates to employment-based 
green cards. As mentioned previously, obtaining legal residence through em-
ployment requires sponsorship by an employer who has an approved Labor 
Certification Application,115 and the employee must maintain that employ-
ment throughout the process.116 For employment-based immigration, the 
number of available visas is limited each year, and visas are distributed ac-
cording to priority date (among other variables).117 The priority date is used 
to determine the applicant’s place in the queue, and when it finally gets to 
that place in line (the application becomes “current”), the immigrant can ap-
ply for adjustment of status to permanent residence status.118 But the Labor 
Certification Application determines the priority date, and if the employee 
changes employers, the new employer files a new application, resetting the 
priority date.119 
As such, I propose the priority date be amended to allow H1B employ-
ees that have transferred between similar positions at different employers be 
allowed to maintain the priority date from the original employer. It is outside 
the scope of this Note to suggest whether this should also be changed for non-
H1B employees trying to obtain permanent residence. But within the H1B 
context, this would increase mobility of H1B employees, the goal of this pro-
posal. 
Each of these proposed changes would make H1B visa employees more 
mobile, making it easier for them to change employers if another employer 
offered them a higher salary. This would strengthen market forces affecting 
H1B employee wages after the employee is already working in the United 
States. While there would still be transaction costs involved in switching em-
ployers that could prevent some employment moves, these changes would 
lower those costs and allow for more competition over H1B employees. 
 C. Outsourcing 
To reduce outsourcing firms’ use of the H1B program to outsource U.S. 
jobs to other countries, the $60,000 salary/master’s degree exception should 
be eliminated. If an employer is an H1B-dependent employer or a willful 
violator, it should have to make the additional statements related to non-dis-
placement and recruitment of U.S. workers. If the structure of the H1B pro-
gram is changed per my proposals above, then there would be less of a need 
to remove this exception, as these firms would likely be unable to pay just 
$60,000 for H1B employees. 
But if the current structure is maintained, then this proposal is a simple 
 
 115 Once again, this is not to be confused with the LCA of the H1B program. 
 116 GORDON ET AL., supra note 68, § 44.01. 
 117 Id. § 51.03. 
 118 See id. 
 119 Id. 
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means to end the outsourcing abuse. Without having to compete on salary, 
the outsourcing firms have realized they simply need to compete in the lot-
tery, thus filing increasingly large numbers of petitions.120 This results in pay-
ing many multiples of the ordinary fees.121 These fees are not paid to the 
employees, and U.S. workers do not see this premium employers are paying. 
Instead, these firms should have to compete on salary. Barring this, there 
should be no exception from the additional scrutiny for H1B-dependent em-
ployers and willful violators. 
Opponents of this change may argue that this will lead to an increase in 
outsourcing. This is essentially the same argument refuted above, that these 
firms keep some jobs in the U.S. by helping others move overseas. But the 
law marks a clear policy decision to reduce U.S. employer competitiveness 
to protect U.S. workers. Just as the Contract Labor Laws in the nineteenth 
century forced U.S. firms relying on manual labor to pay more for that man-
ual labor, the H1B program forces U.S. firms relying on specialized 
knowledge to pay more for people with that specialized knowledge. Without 
the 85,000 visa cap and the wage provisions, U.S. employers would be able 
to pay much less, making them more competitive. So the question should not 
be whether my proposals would decrease U.S. firm competitiveness; rather, 
the question should be how much is too much of a decrease. Here, nothing in 
the law suggests employers should have the discretion to use the program to 
move some of their jobs to other countries, so removing this loophole only 
serves to further the law. With respect to the H1B market, this is something 
the government could consider in setting the limits on employers and appli-
cants in the H1B marketplace. 
 V. CONCLUSION 
The primary purpose of the H1B visa program is to help bridge labor 
gaps in the United States in occupations that require special knowledge with-
out displacing U.S. workers. This Note argues that there is currently a per-
manent internal loss of U.S. jobs to foreign workers, as the structure of the 
H1B program allows employers to pay H1B employees less than they should 
have to pay. Additionally, the structure of the program reduces the mobility 
of H1B employees, making it difficult for the market to correct salaries that 
are too low. These factors cause employers to prefer to hire H1B employees 
and, ultimately, wages to stagnate. Because wages stagnate, U.S. workers do 
not try to move to fill the gap in the U.S. labor supply, and foreign workers 
continually fill many U.S. jobs. This Note also discusses outsourcing and 
 
 120 See Julia Preston, Large Companies Game H-1B Visa Program, Costing the U.S. Jobs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2015, at A1. 
 121 For example, if three petitions are filed for every one visa, then these firms are essentially paying 
three fees for each employee they hire. Meanwhile, the fees can add up to as much as $4,000 per petition. 
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how the H1B program has been used to permanently move jobs to other coun-
tries. 
This Note argues that changing the prevailing wage and actual wage 
requirements will not fix either problem. Changes to those provisions could 
make them more effective at ensuring H1B employees are not paid less than 
U.S. workers. However, such changes would not solve the problem that the 
H1B system perpetuates a U.S. labor gap by causing wages to stagnate. These 
changes also would only affect outsourcing firms if the prevailing or actual 
wage increased above $60,000, and even then, it would only be a small de-
terrent. As such, this Note argues market forces should be introduced to the 
hiring stage of the H1B program and strengthened by increasing the mobility 
of H1B employees after they have begun working in the United States. If 
neither of these changes are made, the outsourcing issue could still be ad-
dressed by removing the $60,000/master’s degree exception to the additional 
attestations required of H1B-dependent employers and willful violators. 
 
